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<Executive Summary>  
 
 
Korea’s New Growth Strategy 
 
 Established a legal act on Green Growth (GG) to meet emission target 
and promote eco-friendly investment and development 
- e.g., set a national goal of cutting emissions by 30 % below 2020 
BAU in 2009 
  Prepared for a variety of green growth measures in 2009, and will 
put those plans into action (Green Tax and Budget Reform; GTBR) 
in a few years 
- e.g., Plans to use property, automobile, and energy-carbon taxes to 
reduce CO2  emissions and promote green growth 
 Establish the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in Seoul in 2010 
 
Current Issues and Performance 
 
 Low performance of Market Based Instruments (MBIs) for environmental 
protection in Korea 
 Need to target environmentally related taxes into energy, transport 
(cars), other pollution and resource use more directly and accurately  
according to externalities 
 Erode seriously their environmental effectiveness so far, though 
environmentally related taxes in Korea is not small (almost 3% of 
GDP), since i) earmarked mostly for transportation infrastructure and   
ii) allowed for tax reductions, refunds or exemptions for most energy-
intensive sectors/activities 
 
Challenges and Obstacles 
 
 Earmark more for environmental purposes rather than for transport 
infrastructure funding 
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 Enhance other direct/accurate MBIs for road infrastructure funding such 
as other transport taxes (km charge), road use/vehicle fees and charges (so 
as to discourage both car ownership and to use/encourage public 
transport) 
 Use direct ex-post „compensation‟ options rather than ex-ante 
„mitigation‟ options for internationally-competing sectors and low-
income groups 
 Need more subsidies and public investments since renewable portion is so 
small, while reducing environmentally harmful subsidies 
 
A Suggestion for International Policy Coordination :  
Founding ICF (like IMF) 
 
 Found an international authority (namely, International Carbon Fund, 
ICF) to deal only with the global externality that cross borders: 
 Supranational governance over the common integrated unit (e.g., at 
the EU, UN, or UNESCAP level etc) 
 Design the common minimum level of carbon tax, and collect the 
revenues to be recycled back to the unit (e.g., EU Directive) 
 Implement various GTBR-related MBIs and fund-raising to deal with 
competitiveness and equity concerns (so as to minimize socio-political 
barriers) 
 Finance clean technology investments, renewables, and spillover R&D,    
e.g., CDM 
 
Objectives of Green Tax Policies 
 
How will we meet the difficult global challenges before us, while 
simultaneously improving people’s lives and conserving the 
environment? 
 
 There is a widespread agreement on globally based efforts to investigate 
how to help the environment economically, with ultimate objective of 
stabilizing climate change. For practical purpose, Eco Tax Reform (ETR) 
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becomes a credible choice in the ongoing policy discussion over how best 
to address global warming and to comply with implementing the 
President Lee‟s „Low-Carbon, Green Growth‟ project. 
 Green Growth purports to achieve economic growth with generating 
enough jobs while preserving the limited ecological carrying capacity of 
the environment. 
 Eco Tax Reform (ETR) is the term used for changes in the national tax 
system where the burden of taxes shifts from „goods‟, such as labor, 
capital or clean consumption to „bads‟ such as activities that lead to 
environmental pressures. 
 It is one of the key instruments to achieve the plan which would be 
both fiscally prudent and environmentally sound. 
 Taxes on motor fuels and motor vehicles have been rather stable as 
portion of total tax revenues generated about 90% of the revenue from 
environmentally related taxes in the European Union. 
 They have designed taxes that target a broader array of tax bases, not 
only to reduce CO2 emissions but also to cope with air pollution, 
noise levels and traffic congestion, including plastic bags, landfill 
waste, aggregates, batteries and pesticides. 
 There are proven cases of eco benefits for each type of instruments. 
Taxes and charges have proved effective as shown by congestion 
charging in London, road-user charging for heavy goods vehicles in 
Switzerland, NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) taxes on air pollution in Sweden, 
and plastic bag levies in Ireland. Tax differentials were of major 
importance for unleaded fuel. 
 Some policy instruments are not feasible without suitable monitoring or 
administrative capacity. And there is no single recipe for a successful and 
effective tax scheme. Different factors determine the functioning of the 
specific schemes, each in their own context. 
 Examples include the Danish waste-disposal tax (high tax rates), the 
Norwegian pesticide tax (tax rates differentiated according to toxicity), 
the London congestion charge (strong champion; rather high charge), and 
Irish plastic bag tax (awareness of the advantage and simplicity of 
alternative behavior). 
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Effects of Eco Tax Reform 
 
 The positive effects of eco tax reform are the reduction of energy 
consumption both at national and households‟ level, the decrease of CO2 
emissions, the diversification of energy sources, the creation of 
specialized employment, and the promotion of sustainable production and 
consumption models. 
 One negative short-term impact is on heavy energy users such as fossil 
fuel electricity and steel industry. 
 Undoubtedly, the eco tax reform would be more effective and the 
impact on international competitiveness would be smaller if more 
countries participate or take equivalent measures. 
 My own analysis of the „green-growth potential indicator‟ shows that 
green growth relies crucially on the degree of prior tax distortions and 
eco-efficiency. 
 This result indicate that Korea‟s “win-win” potential index is ranked 
to 18th in 30 OECD countries. (Here the “win-win” potential index is 
defined as the ratio of eco-efficiency to prior tax distortion.) 
 The Korea‟s “win-win” potential index is 5.74 that is lower than 7.02, 
the OECD average of “win-win” potential index and it is well behind 
to some cases of Switzerland(21.25), Japan(16.64), Norway(12.97), 
United Kingdom(8.70) and US(7.16). 
 This is mainly due to industrial production structures and people‟s 
consumption patterns that are still not energy-efficient and 
environmentally unfriendly. 
 
Carbon Taxation: When-questions? 
 
 The implementation of a CO2 tax has to be met by increasing energy 
efficiency and using low-carbon energy sources 
 which would reduce CO2 emissions, and it could provide more 
explicit price signal for firms to promote the development of new 
emission-reduction technologies. 
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The more we delay, the more we pay. How much we lose if we delay 
optimal fiscal policies for ecologically sustainable development? 
 
 In case with a climate sensitivity of 3.4 (i.e., 3.40C temperature increase 
of doubling CO2 concentration), my own calculation indicates that : 
 The cost of regrets by 10-years delay amounts to about 4% of Gross 
World Product, which wipes out South Korea‟s GDP in 2000. (or 
World average = 0.6% of GDP in each country). 
 Here, the “regrets,” as a social cost of procrastination, is 
approximated by the net-present value of the future consumption 
losses of optimal policies “with each specific procrastination 
constraint” relative to “without procrastination activities”. 
 This result reveals that, even with uncertainty, the “regrets” are not 
negligible but significant. 
 implies that the endogenously calculated possibility and risk of 
probabilistic regrets can increase substantially with the years of 
procrastination. 
 
Carbon Taxation: How-questions? 
 
 Not only developed countries but also developing countries and 
economies in transition need to actively take part in shifting to more eco-
efficient production and consumption patterns. 
 Compared with other countries, Korea‟s ecological footprint was short as 
calculated by the UN Environment Program. The increasing rate of 
carbon emission in Korea is one of the highest around the world due to 
the high degree of dependence on heavy and chemistry-based industrial 
structure. Also, lack of understanding of energy savings makes our 
energy efficiency less competitive. 
 
The Korean government is now mulling the introduction of a carbon 
tax, which taxes the combustion of fossil fuels according to their carbon 
contents. 
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 The taxation of energy in Korea has been earmarked mostly for 
transportation infrastructure and still allowed for tax reductions and 
exemptions for most energy-intensive sectors, undermining seriously its 
environmental effectiveness. 
 e.g., the earmarked "transportation-energy-environment tax" (which 
is subject to a 2012 clause) would need to be converted an individual 
consumption tax so as to increase the allocative efficiency and the 
flexibility of government spendings. 
 
 Based on experience in OECD countries, Korea could gradually shift 
more some of tax burdens from income to energy, while addressing 
properly their potential impact on international competitiveness and 
distributional concerns. 
 To do this, the Korean government needs to consider further the full 
environmental costs and other external costs in setting tax rates on 
energy, phasing out various exemptions and environmentally harmful 
subsidies, and introduce a carbon tax to curb CO2 emissions in the 
near future. 
 
 According to the analysis of McKinsey‟s Antonio Volpin and Cambridge 
Econometrics in UK, the average price of CO2 emission trading is 
estimated to 25 EUR (= 31,828 won in 2007) from 2008 to 2012. 
 e.g., by this way, Kim et al.(2008) suggest that, as a carbon tax in 
Korea, the appropriate size of carbon tax revenue would be about 10 
tril. KRW (= 1% of GDP in Korea). 
- However, Cutting CO2 emissions would involve costs that are 
uncertain but could be substantial. 
 And a gradually rising tax, starting with a “low-rate” carbon tax, e.g., 
1 tril. KRW tax revenue (= 0.1% of GDP), would allow for a 
smoother transition to a less carbon-intensive economy and would 
increase a political feasibility of the tax plan in Korea. 
- Businesses and households would have more time to replace their 
equipment and energy-use practices with more efficient 
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alternatives. 
 
 The government could introduce a new energy-carbon tax in 2013 to 
partly offset the public budget deficits from planned corporate income tax 
cuts(e.g., the size of carbon tax revenue, 0.1 – 0.3% of GDP). Introducing 
carbon tax would help cut emissions and stimulate clean technology 
investment.  
 Implement a new carbon tax to have scope for reducing more 
distortive prior taxes in Korea such as corporate income taxes.  
 Also could increase tax benefits for corporate investment and R&D 
efforts in carbon reduction and energy-saving activities.  
 Kim et al.(2010) show that the overall “positive” effect on economic 
efficiency(GDP) of implementing a new carbon tax scheme from 
2013 together with corporate income tax(CIT) cuts and eco R&D 
subsidies in Korea would be significant. 
  
 This is time for setting up the Korea‟s Eco Tax Reform with a view to our 
future development and it should also reflect more closely the sustainable 
issue being addressed.  
 Introducing carbon tax would help cut emissions and stimulate clean 
technology investment while raising much-needed revenue for the 
government (or enhancing fiscal soundness). 
 To implement a carbon tax realistically, we have many challenges to 
address, like setting a detailed tax rate (in a realistic way), linking it 
with other prior tax system and with other instruments such as ETS 
and NA program, tackling the income redistribution issue, and 
reaching a political agreement. 
 Recently many countries are paying higher attention to a carbon tax 
rather than sticking to existing measures of direct regulation. 
 
Political Barriers and Check Points 
 
1. Sectoral Competitiveness Issues 
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 On the early stage of implementing eco tax reform in many countries, 
there were concerns about losing international competitiveness of 
industries and business association. 
 However, as regards of impact of the scheme has been successful through 
performing with clear goal and collecting public opinions. 
 In German case, it could achieve by differentiating tax rates and 
making special provisions for vulnerable groups. So that private 
households and small businesses are those who are unlikely to pay 
high rates. 
 In UK, there has been extensive consultation with business and 
designed in a way that protects the competitiveness of UK firms. For 
example, UK industries and businesses receive a 80% discount to 
Climate Change Levy(CCL) in return for Climate Change 
Agreements(CCA) to meet energy efficiency and/or carbon emission 
targets. 
 In fact, eco tax reform would lead to increased competitiveness as a result 
of fiscally neutral and net positive effects on employment due to the 
decrease of more distortive taxes on income and the promotion of 
innovation of new green R&D technologies. 
 
2. Equity concerns 
 
 It is also important to devise appropriate compensation fiscal schemes for 
the poor households group. 
 Applying new environmental taxes in full, combined with 
compensation schemes for the poor, would be the role of 
environmental taxation. 
 OECD recommend to use ex post direct compensations rather than ex 
ante tax exemptions of this purpose. 
 
3. Gradual Phase-In 
 
 From experience in countries that have already implemented eco tax 
reform in Europe, we may need a gradual phasing-in of the reforms and 
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the use of a public information campaign for stronger incentives later on. 
 UK‟s fuel duty escalator can be a good example as a slow but sure 
way of making policy instruments more demanding and effective. 
 
4. Public Acceptance and Compliance (Political Feasibility) 
 
 It is also important to maintain transparency in the planning and use of 
the tax revenue which can defuse potential opposition to a new 
environmental tax charge. 
 It is necessary to weigh partly conflicting demands against each other 
for energy-intensive sectors, and compatibility with market principles 
and issues of administrative feasibility. 
 „Green tax commissions‟ or „inter-ministerial committees‟ for eco tax 
reform should be emphasized. 
 For Korea, the carbon tax scheme would need to designed alongside a 
broader fiscal package of measures (notionally funded from carbon tax 
revenues) in order to protect the international competitiveness of firms 
and/or low-income families.  
 For instance, energy-intensive industries could receive a discount to 
the proposed carbon tax rates in return for joining a successful NA 
programs to improve energy efficiency and/or reduce emissions to 
specific levels.  
 Hypothecation of part of carbon tax revenue to subsidize green 
projects in industries and/or low-income families could also raise 
public acceptability of new carbon taxation. 
 
5.  Administration and Governance 
 
 „Green tax commissions‟ or „inter-ministerial committees‟ for eco tax 
reform should be emphasized. 
 They make proposals for environmental tax reform and act as a 
forum for discussion on topics that include design, rates and the 
likely impacts. 
 Analyzing and recommending to reform by political parties and 
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academic and institute circles can be available. 
 
6.  International Cooperation 
 
 Knowledge transfer between countries (e.g., via GGGI`) about the use of 
economic instruments in environmental policy would be desirable, 
whereby country-specific conditions are being considered when such a 
transfer is done. 
 
Ways Forward for Korea 
 
 There are still ways to go, even though government got off to a first step 
to eco-sound fiscal policies. 
 Compared with other OECD countries, Korea has less energy-
efficient industrial structures with complicated fiscal policies and 
large differences of tax burdens on each energy sectors. 
 Therefore, Korea is now facing to prepare for the post-Kyoto scheme 
which would enforce to find a new paradigm for dealing with 
environmental sustainability and economic growth. 
 In order to implement the Korea‟s new scheme successfully, a key 
theme “green taxes” would be essential to provide greater efficiency 
gain through helping to „get the prices right‟ associated with their 
environmental externalities. 
 It is time to reform the current tax system to promote a new growth 
engine, Green Growth in Korea. 
 
 Further, it is required to devise secondary instruments such as direct 
compensation payments, price support and tax exemptions for unfair 
burdens of low-income households and more energy-vulnerable sectors. 
 All those approaches might be offset of distributional consequences 
as mitigating the harmfulness of eco-motivated fiscal policies. 
 
 It‟s pretty obvious that the more we delay action, the more cost we pay. If 
we invest green technology in recent economic slowdown, we will have a 
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global initiative that would make our economy more competitive in the 
long run. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Copenhagen Accord in 2009 is meant to represent a broad political 
agreement between countries, including G20, accounting for about 80% of global 
carbon emissions. It requires for developed countries to submit pledges for 
emissions cuts and climate financial aid by 2020 (as an extension of the Kyoto 
protocol), and for developing countries to indicate their voluntary actions 
including targets to cut carbon/energy intensity, to increase renewable energy 
portion, and/or to reduce deforestation. 
 
Recently fifty-five countries have pledged emission cuts to the UN under the 
Copenhagen accord.
1
 These countries account for 78 per cent of global emissions 
from energy use, according to a UNFCCC release.  
 
Asia’s fourth-largest energy consumer set an ambitious goal of cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below expected levels in 2020 
(November, 2009). This is one of the most aggressive targets in the non-Annex I 
countries. It also promotes environment-friendly investment and development   
(see Table 1). 
 
Korea‟s announcement was made immediately ahead of the much anticipated 
climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009. The Korea‟s target setting is a voluntary 
and unilateral action, and Korea hopes its efforts will create a more conducive 
atmosphere for other developing countries‟ engagement as well as further 
commitments from developed countries.  
 
The Korea‟s national strategy of Green Growth is a comprehensive long-term 
master plan. It envisages three main objectives as follows: (i) to deal effectively 
with climate change and energy independence, (ii) create new growth engines on 
multiple fronts, and (iii) to raise overall quality of life for the people and to 
enhance contribution to the international community through strong advocacy for 
green growth(PCGG, 2008). 
                                                 
1
 It represents the first time that large emerging economies such as China and India have made 
written commitments to the international community that they will curb their carbon emissions. 
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Korea recently established a Comprehensive Act on Green Growth to meet the 
emission target and promote environmentally-friendly investment and 
development (January, 2010). The government review is now under way to assess 
the feasibility of a levy on carbon. It is considering using property, automobile, 
and energy-carbon taxes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote green 
growth. It is also pushing for a new Negotiated Agreement(NA) system in 2013 
and a national cap-and-trade system legislation in 2015 and for providing  
support for 10 key green technologies including carbon capture and storage, a 
smart grid and next-generation batteries.
2
  
 
The Korean government prepared for a variety of measures of the green growth 
in 2009 and will put those plans into action (Green Tax & Budget Reform
3
; 
GTBR in Figure 1). Although some companies voiced their worries on the policy 
direction and many of the Korean companies are newcomers to green industries, 
Korean companies have been quite supportive of the Green Growth initiative. 
640 Korean companies would start participating in a voluntary pilot carbon 
emissions trading system from 2010. 
 
The government also established the Global Green Growth Institute(GGGI) in 
Seoul (June, 2010) to help countries share their policy experiences on climate 
change and to enhance their world-wide green growth strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 A smart grid system enables homes and factories to use electricity during off-peak hours 
through a two-way communication between power suppliers and consumers. Korea established a 
major test bed facility for the smart grid system on Jeju Island in 2009, which will be completed 
by 2013.  
3
 In this paper we will use GTBR and ETR(eco tax reform interchangeably where the former has a 
broader concept  than the latter. 
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Table 1.  The Copenhagen-Accord Emissions Reduction Targets by 2020 
     (Unit : %) 
 
CO2 emissions 
relative to 
Carbon 
Intensity 
relative to 
 
1990 
level 
2000 
level 
2005 
level 
2020 
BAU* 
2005 level 
EU states 20     
Norway 40     
Croatia 5     
US   17   
Canada   17   
Moldova 25     
South Africa    34  
Brazil    38.9  
Russia 25     
      
Japan 25     
Australia  25    
New Zealand 20     
South Korea    30  
Indonesia    26  
Singapore    16  
China     45 
India     25 
Note: BAU represents Business as usual case with no climate policy 
Source: UNFCCC, 2010;  Boao Report, 2010 
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Figure 1. Objectives of Green Tax and Budget Reform (GTBR) 
 
 
 
 
II. MECHANISMS FOR GREEN GROWTH 
 
When can environmental fiscal reform boost both economic growth and social 
welfare? To ensure that economic growth and the preservation of environmental 
quality are compatible and socially optimal, it is crucial to understand the 
interactions among economic activities, technological progress, and ecological 
processes over time.  Policies for ecologically sustainable economic growth 
(green growth) may be more effective if technological progress in abatement 
knowledge responds to economic incentives.  If so, how can environmental 
investment and taxation contribute to the productivity of private factors of 
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production and to green growth, and how much sustainable development can we 
expect from these policies?  
 
This section discusses environmental fiscal policies, using Fullerton and Kim 
(2008)‟s model, within an endogenous growth model with pollution, distortionary 
income taxes, and three assets: natural capital, abatement knowledge, and private 
capital (both physical and human capital).
4
  Fig. A1 in Appendix depicts a 
schematic diagram for greening the tax and budget system towards ecologically 
sustainable economic growth. 
 
Here, individual household utility (U) depends on consumption (C) of the final 
good and on the quality of the environment (N). This environmental quality is a 
stock that acts as a nonrival consumption good but also as a productive public 
input to production. The economy has three types of assets. The first is private 
capital (K, including both physical and human capital), and the second is public 
abatement knowledge capital (H, a nonrival environmental R&D good). Either of 
these first two types of asset can be accumulated by devoting to it some fraction 
of output. The third type of asset is environmental quality (natural capital), which 
is modeled as a stock of a renewable resource. Pollution (P) is inevitable from 
production activities, but it can be reduced by increasing the stock of pollution 
abatement knowledge (e.g., clean technology) and by imposing environmental 
regulations on production activities (e.g., pollution standards, permit, or taxes).  
 
Also, 'effective pollution (Z),' is an input that can be provided either by actual 
pollution (P) or through the stock of available public abatement knowledge (H). 
Thus, the same output can be achieved with less actual pollution if the firm has 
access to more abatement knowledge. The parameter  denotes a pollution-
conversion factor (or relative productivity of P relative to H): a higher   makes 
                                                 
4
  Recent advances in endogenous growth theories have opened up the possibility of analyzing the 
growth effects of various policy changes in the long-run (Fig. A8). In particular, models with the 
environment along this line argue that a tighter environmental policy may boost growth, at least in 
the long-run. They derive optimal environmental policies for internalizing environmental 
externalities in a sustainable growth framework.  However, most of these previous models simply 
assume that the public sector's environmental R&D activities to generate pollution abatement 
knowledge are financed through lump-sum taxation rather than through other distortionary taxes. 
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pollution more effective, or equivalently, makes abatement relatively less 
effective.
5
 
 
Following Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), Fig. A2 depicts growth and 
depletion of the renewable natural resource, which is modeled according to the 
following accumulation equation:  
 
    PNEN  )( ,   where  E'  E/N  ≶0    and    E"  ∂2E/∂N2 < 0,        (1) 
 
where N  denotes the stock of natural capital (environmental quality), P is 
pollution, and where a dot over any variable represents the change over time.  
E(N) represents ecological growth through regeneration processes.  This 
regeneration might initially increase with a larger N (that is, E' > 0), but it 
eventually peaks and declines (E' < 0) as the environment approaches its natural 
state.  Thus, natural capital accumulation features diminishing returns (E" < 0). 
The second term, pollution P, indicates the deterioration of environmental quality 
through the extractive use of natural resources in production (e.g., using up clean 
air or water). On a sustainable steady-state path where 0N , eq. (1) implies that 
P = E(N). Thus, E(N) represents the absorption capacity of the environment. 
 
Here, we have three main tensions or sets of opposing forces that affect welfare 
and growth.  First, a cut in pollution has a direct effect that reduces output, but it 
has an indirect effect that raises output through the increase in environmental 
quality. A second tension is that growth may cause pollution, but it also generates 
resources for abatement knowledge that may reduce pollution. The improved 
quality of the environment or the increased stock of abatement knowledge can 
allow the economy to absorb a larger flow of effective pollution in the steady 
state. Finally, the economy also has a tension between the positive effects of 
investment in abatement knowledge and the negative effects from distortionary 
                                                 
5
  Unlike the literature, we here generalize the treatment of pollution and abatement in production 
so that they are not equally effective. The addition of this one parameter has important 
implications, however, as environmental policy no longer must have the same effect on growth as 
on welfare. This pollution-conversion parameter () reflects mainly “eco-efficiency” related to 
country-specific production structures or endowment conditions, and so we do not impose any 
prior restrictions on it. Indeed, we show how the difference between the productivities of man-
made input H and natural input P plays a crucial role in determining optimal environmental and 
fiscal policy. The studies by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996) do not consider this 
possibility but just assume  Z = HP  and    = 1. 
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income taxes made necessary by that increase in non-productive government 
spending.  
 
As in Fig. A1, the government here is assumed to raise revenues by adopting a 
positive income tax rate, K , and a positive pollution tax, P .  Tax revenues are 
used to finance “government expenditures on public investment” ( Hq H   
H Hq H ) and lump-sum transfers to households (G).  Further, we suppose that 
government fixes the ratio of the lump-sum transfer payments relative to private 
income, /G rK  . This parameter is used below as a measure of the extent to 
which distorting taxes are necessary. Assuming a balanced budget at any moment, 
the budget constraint of government can be written as:  
 
K P H H HrK P q H q H G      ,    or  (dividing by  rK),            (2a)  
K  + /PP rK  =   +  ,                             (2b)  
 
where /PP rK  represents the ratio of pollution tax revenue to private capital 
income,
6
 and where   /H H Hq H q H rK    is the ratio of gross public 
investment in abatement knowledge to private capital income.
7
 
For the market economy described above, a benevolent government needs to 
intervene to ensure the optimal provision of the two public goods N and H. In this 
case, where lump-sum taxation is not available, it is important to know how the 
public investment in abatement knowledge is financed and what becomes of the 
taxes collected. Government must take as given the decentralized optimizing 
behavior of firms and households, the ecological constraint, and government 
budget constraint, while affecting the allocation of resources among the three 
type of capital (K, H, and N) through its policy variables ( ,K  ,P and H ). Then, 
in this second-best world, it must act to satisfy the following „arbitrage 
condition‟: 
 
 
                                                 
6
  From the firm's first-order conditions, we know that the ratio of pollution tax revenue to private 
capital income is  PP/rK =  /(1- ), which is always constant in our economy.  
 
7
  For environmental and non-environmental taxes in OECD countries, see Fig. A13 in Appendix.  
In particular, this shows environmental tax burden relative to other taxes in 2002.   
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(1 ) /H PK K H
H H P P
F q U U A E
r A P F
q Z q N C N N
   
 
     
              
 , (3) 
 
 
which says that investments in the three types of capital are traded off against 
each other and also against household savings. The first equality in eq. (3) says 
that the net return on private investments [ (1 )K Kr   ] should match the return 
on investment in abatement knowledge (consisting of the current return in 
production and a capital gain), given the economy-wide pollution level, P.  The 
second equality in eq. (3) says that environmental quality  N  should also earn the 
same rate of return as public abatement knowledge. The return on environmental 
quality in eq. (3) consists of (i) its contribution to utility (the consumption 
externality), (ii) its contribution to total factor productivity (the production 
externality), (iii) its contribution to ecological processes (marginal absorption 
capacity), and (iv) a scarcity rent (capital gain). The Hotelling rule states that if 
the natural resource is exhaustible, the rate of its price increase ( /P P  ) should 
equal the rate of return on private capital. Hence, eq. (3) can be interpreted as a 
generalized Hotelling rule for renewable natural resource (in the presence of 
distortionary taxation). 
Optimal corrective policy rules in our economy induce the market equilibrium 
path to match the socially-efficient path. What level of policy rules should then 
be adopted to maximize social welfare, including concerns about global warming, 
and how do the resulting long-run growth outcomes react to changes in the set of 
economic and natural parameters in the economy? These questions often arise in 
environmental fiscal policy debates over greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement. 
 
How are growth and welfare affected by a tighter environmental policy in the 
presence of the externalities and distortionary taxation?  It is typically argued that 
pollution control hurts growth by raising abatement costs.
8
  With endogenous 
growth, however, environmental policy may have permanent effects on the 
productivity of the economy. If pollution taxes are sub-optimally low, for 
                                                 
8
 Most of the early literature assumes exogenous technological progress that is independent of 
environmental policy as in Fig. A8. See Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990), Nordhaus (1994), and 
Goulder (1995) among many others.  In these models, environmental protection has costs that 
reduce growth (see Fig. A9).  
rate of return on private capital  rate of return on abatement knowledge rate of return on natural capital 
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example, then pollution is excessive.  Natural capital is then under-accumulated, 
which affects production. 
 
To investigate the growth effects of tighter environmental policy, we can see the 
long-run growth rate then reacts to changes in pollution taxation as: 
 
     
1
(1 ) ( ) 1K K EN N
ddg
r E N
d d

 
    
  
 
     
 
,                           (4)  
 
 
where  ( / )( / )N dN d N    is the elasticity of natural capital with respect to 
the pollution tax and  ( / )( / )EN dE dN N E    is the elasticity of the absorption 
capacity of the environment with respect to natural capital. In our model, the 
curve that relates environmental tax rates and their growth (or welfare) effects 
can now be in an inverted U-shape function. Also, we can have the relationship 
between the growth-maximizing pollution tax and the welfare-maximizing 
pollution tax.  
 
 
 
1/
(0) (0) 1 (1 )
( ) 1 ( )
(1 1/ ) 1
EN N
K C NdW W dg
E N N
d g g d



  
   
     

   
     
    
   (5) 
 
 
As illustrated in Fig. A11, note that maximizing growth is not equivalent to 
maximizing welfare, and the first term in eq. (5) reveals the difference. The key 
parameters affecting this difference are the size of tax distortions (), the 
productivity of pollution (), and the differentiated additional effects of  on 
welfare and environmental sustainability by ( )EN N   .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tax replacement effect improved productivity effect for private capital 
welfare effect growth effect 
 22 
III. CARBON TAX SCHEME FOR GREEN 
GROWTH IN KOREA 
 
 
How will we meet the difficult global challenges before us, while 
simultaneously improving people’s lives and conserving the environment?  
 
There is a widespread agreement on globally based efforts to investigate how to 
help the environment economically, with ultimate objective of stabilizing climate 
change. For practical purpose, Eco Tax Reform (ETR) becomes a credible choice 
in the ongoing policy discussion over how best to address global warming and to 
comply with implementing the President Lee‟s „Low Carbon, Green Growth‟ 
project. 
 
Green Growth purports to achieve economic growth with generating enough jobs 
while preserving the limited ecological carrying capacity of the environment. Eco 
Tax Reform (ETR), as partly illustrated in Figure 2, is the term used for changes 
in the national tax system where the burden of taxes shifts from „goods‟, such as 
labor, capital or clean consumption to „bads‟ such as activities that lead to 
environmental pressures. It is one of the key instruments to achieve the plan 
which would be both fiscally prudent and environmentally sound. 
 
OECD countries have continued to increase and refine their use of environmental 
tax instruments for the Green Tax and Budget Reform since early 1990s. 
Countries in Nordic region including Finland (1990), then Sweden (1991) and 
Denmark (1993) were the first to launch such reforms, followed by the 
Netherlands (1996, 2001), Germany (1999) and the United Kingdom (1996, 2001 
and 2002) 
 
With its current draft, economic and environmental effects of ETR are quite 
positive. And some countries have shown considerable efforts in developing ETR 
in recent years. For example, environmental tax revenues have increased by about 
36% since the launch of the German ETR in 1999. As part of the German 
program, about an additional EUR 20 billion was raised by energy taxed in 2003. 
The Swedish ETR contributes about 0.1% of GDP.  
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Figure 2. The Concept of Greening the Tax and Budget System 
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Taxes on motor fuels and motor vehicles have been rather stable as portion of 
total tax revenues generated about 90% of the revenue from environmentally 
related taxes in the European Union. They have designed taxes that target a 
broader array of tax bases, not only to reduce CO2 emissions but also to cope 
with air pollution, noise levels and traffic congestion, including plastic bags, 
landfill waste, aggregates, batteries and pesticides. 
 
For example, Table 2 provides an overview of the use of environmental taxes and 
charges in OECD countries.  
 
There are proven cases of eco benefits for each type of instruments. Taxes and 
charges have proved effective as shown by congestion charging in London, road-
user charging for heavy goods vehicles in Switzerland, NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) 
taxes on air pollution in Sweden, and plastic bag levies in Ireland. Tax 
differentials were of major importance for unleaded fuel.  
 
Some policy instruments are not feasible without suitable monitoring or 
administrative capacity. And there is no single recipe for a successful and 
Tax 
reform 
Budget 
reform 
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effective tax scheme. Different factors determine the functioning of the specific 
schemes, each in their own context.  
 
Examples include the Danish waste-disposal tax (high tax rates), the Norwegian 
pesticide tax (tax rates differentiated according to toxicity), the London 
congestion charge (strong champion; rather high charge), and Irish plastic bag tax 
(awareness of the advantage and simplicity of alternative behavior).  
 
 
Table 2. Examples of Environmental Taxes 
 
Eco Tax Country Remarks 
Energy and CO2 
-Norway : CO2 tax 
-Germany: Energy tax  
-2% reduction in CO2 
emission 
-Increase in the world price 
of oil 
Air Pollution  -Sweden: NOx charge Unique example 
Agricultural input -Norway: Tax on 
pesticides  
 
Product  -Ireland: Plastic bag levy Reduction around 90% of 
carrier bags 
Waste 
-Denmark:: Waste tax 
-UK: Landfill tax 
-Reduction in waste 
 
Water 
-Netherlands: Wastewater 
effluent chares 
-Denmark:  Tax on tap 
water 
-Water Pollution decrease 
90 % 
-26% reduction in total 
water consumption 
Transport 
-London, UK: Congestion 
charge 
-Switzerland: Road-user 
charges 
-Reduced congestion in 
zone / Increased interest 
from other countries 
 
Sources: OECD/EEA database on environment-related taxes, Ministries of Finance and Environment of the 
European countries 
 
 
The positive effects of eco tax reform are the reduction of energy consumption 
both at national and households‟ level, the decrease of CO2 emissions, the 
diversification of energy sources, the creation of specialized employment, and the 
promotion of sustainable production and consumption models.  
 
One negative short-term impact is on heavy energy users such as fossil fuel 
electricity and steel industry. Undoubtedly, the eco tax reform would be more 
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effective and the impact on international competitiveness would be smaller if 
more countries participate or take equivalent measures.   
 
My own analysis of the „green-growth potential indicator‟(or “win-win” potential 
index) shows that green growth relies crucially on the degree of prior tax 
distortions and eco-efficiency. The results in Figure 3 indicate that Korea‟s “win-
win” potential index is ranked to 18th in 30 OECD countries. Here the “win-win” 
potential index is defined as the ratio of eco-efficiency to prior tax distortion. 
 
The Korea‟s “win-win” potential index is 5.74 that is lower than 7.02, the OECD 
average of “win-win” potential index and it is well behind to some cases of 
Switzerland(21.25), Japan(16.64), Norway(12.97), United Kingdom(8.70) and 
US(7.16).  This is mainly due to industrial production structures and people‟s 
consumption patterns that are still not energy-efficient and environmentally 
unfriendly.  
 
 
Figure 3. The “Win-Win” Potential Index : The case of Global Warming 
 
"win-win" potential index (eco-efficiency/prior tax distortion)
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Source: Kim, S.-R. (2005), First Regional Policy Dialogue, UNESCAP International  
Conference, p.157. 
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The more we delay, the more we pay. 
 
How much we lose if we delay optimal fiscal policies for ecologically sustainable 
development? In case with a climate sensitivity of 3.4 (i.e., the degree of 3.4 
0
C 
temperature increase of doubling CO2 concentration), my own calculation, using 
Nordhaus-Boyer DICE model, indicates that the cost of regrets by 10-years delay 
amounts to about 4% of Gross World Product, which wipes out South Korea‟s 
GDP in 2000.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of “Regrets” as a function of Procrastination 
 
(a)  Carbon reduction schedule 
 
(b)  Regrets of prograstination 
Source: Kim, S.-R. (2005) 
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Here, the “regrets,” as a social cost of procrastination, is approximated by the net-
present value of the future consumption losses of optimal policies “with each 
specific procrastination constraint” relative to “without procrastination activities”.  
 
This result reveals that, even with uncertainty, the “regrets” are not negligible but 
significant. Figure 4 implies that the endogenously calculated possibility and risk 
of probabilistic regrets can increase substantially with the years of procrastination.  
 
Not only developed countries but also developing countries and economies in 
transition need to actively take part in shifting to more eco-efficient production 
and consumption patterns. 
 
Compared with other countries, Korea‟s ecological footprint was short as 
calculated by the UN Environment Program. The increasing rate of carbon 
emission in Korea is one of the highest around the world due to the high degree 
of dependence on heavy and chemistry-based industrial structure. Also, lack of 
understanding of energy savings makes our energy efficiency less competitive. 
 
The Korean government is now considering the introduction of a carbon tax, 
which taxes the combustion of fossil fuels according to their carbon contents.   
 
The implementation of a CO2 tax has to be met by increasing energy efficiency 
and using low-carbon energy sources which would reduce CO2 emissions, and it 
could provide more explicit price signal for firms to promote the development of 
new emission-reduction technologies.  
 
The taxation of energy in Korea has been earmarked mostly for transportation 
infrastructure and still allowed for tax reductions and exemptions for most 
energy-intensive sectors, undermining seriously its environmental effectiveness. 
For example, the earmarked "transportation-energy-environment tax" (which is 
subject to a 2009 clause) would need to be converted an individual consumption 
tax so as to increase the allocative efficiency and the flexibility of government 
spendings.  
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Table 3.   Energy Taxation in Korea (2010. 1) 
 
 
Gasoline 
(won/ℓ) 
Kerosene 
(won/ℓ) 
Light oil 
(won/ℓ) 
Heavy 
oil 
(won/ℓ) 
LPG (won//kg) 
LNG1) 
(won/m3) propane Butane 
Customs 
Tax 
General 5% 3% 3% 
Quota 
(Provisional) 
3% 2% 2% 
Individual 
Cons.  Tax 
General - 90 - 17 20 252 48 
Flexibility - 63 - - 14 
275 
(161 
won/ℓ) 
 
Trans. 
Energy 
Environ. 
Tax 
General 475 - 340 - - - - 
Flexibility 529 - 375 - - - - 
Education Tax3) 79 14 56 3 - 
41 
 (24 
won/ℓ) 
- 
Local  Drive Tax4) 138 - 98 - - - - 
VAT 10% 
Import Fee 16 - 19.58 
Quality Examination  
Fee 
0.430 0.027 - 
Safety Management Levy - - - - 4.5 3.9 
Sales Levy 
36 
(High) 
- - - - 
62.283 
(36.42 
won/ℓ) 
- 
Total Tax 
Amount 
Amount 897 198 661 87 184 
527 
(308 
won/ℓ) 
120 
Price  Share 
Ration 
54% 19% 46% 12% 10% 32% 15% 
Consumption  Price 1,661 1,040 1,450 744 1,808 
1,636 
(957 
won/ℓ) 
783 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance(2010), Kim, S.-R. et al.(2010)  
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Based on experience in OECD countries, Korea should shift more some of tax 
burdens from income to energy, while addressing properly their potential impact 
on international competitiveness and distributional concerns. To do this, the 
Korean government needs to consider further the full environmental costs and 
other external costs in setting tax rates on energy, phasing out various exemptions 
and environmentally harmful subsidies, and introduce a carbon tax to curb CO2 
emissions in the near future.  
 
According to the analysis of McKinsey‟s Antonio Volpin and Cambridge 
Econometrics in UK, the average price of CO2 emission trading is estimated to 25 
EUR (= 31,828 won in 2007) from 2008 to 2012. Following this, Kim et 
al.(2008) suggest a carbon tax scheme in Korea, as the rate of emission cost per 
each energy source can be measured by multiplying the price 31,828 won and the 
unit amount of CO2 emissions in Figure 5.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  The Estimated CO2 emission Cost per Each Energy Source 
in Korea 
The estimated CO2 emission cost per each energy source in Korea
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Source:  Kim, S.-R. et al.(2008).  
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Table 4.   Proposed Carbon Tax Schemes on Energy Consumption in Korea 
 
Energy sources 
Gasoline 
(won/ℓ) 
Diesel 
(won/ℓ) 
Kerosene 
(won/ℓ) 
B-C oil 
(won/ℓ) 
Butane 
(won/ℓ) 
Propane 
(won/kg) 
LNG 
(won/kg) 
Bituminous. 
coal 
(won/kg) 
Energy taxation 
(excl. VAT ) 
745 528 104 20 185 20 60 Exempted 
Carbon 
taxation 
Social 
Cost 
(ideal) 
67.5 
(4.4%) 
82.4 
(6.5%) 
77.7 
(8.29%) 
95.5 
(19.4%) 
53.2 
(6.9%) 
92.0 
(6.9%) 
71.0 
(11.1%) 
33.7 
(45.6%) 
Low-
Rate 
(realistic) 
8 
(0.5%) 
10 
(0.8%) 
9 
(1.0%) 
11 
(2.3%) 
6 
(0.8%) 
11 
(0.8%) 
10 
(1.3%) 
4 
(5.3%) 
Note: 1)  Numbers in parenthesis represents increase in  prices for each energy producs by carbon taxation 
          2)  Scenarios for carbon taxation of ‘Social Cost’ and ‘Low-Rate’ are assumed to raise 8.9 tril. KRW  
and 1.0 tril. KRW of tax revenues respectively’ 
Source:  Kim S.-R. et al.(2010) 
 
 
 
Cutting CO2 emissions would involve costs that are uncertain but could be 
substantial. As in Table 4, a “gradually rising” tax, starting with a “low-rate” 
carbon tax, e.g., 1 trillion won tax revenue (= 0.1% of GDP), would allow for a 
smoother transition to a less carbon-intensive economy and could be more 
politically-feasible. Businesses and households would have more time to replace 
their equipment and energy-use practices with more efficient alternatives.
9
  
 
From experience in countries that have already implemented eco tax reform in 
Europe, we may need a gradual phasing-in of the reforms and the use of a public 
information campaign for stronger incentives. UK‟s fuel duty escalator can be a 
good example as a slow but sure way of making policy instruments more 
demanding and effective.  
 
Moreover, implementing a new carbon tax system (energy-carbon tax or elements 
of carbon tax in a broader tax system) would have scope for reducing more 
distortive other prior taxes in Korea such as corporate income taxes. It could be 
                                                 
9
 The proposed carbon tax rates need to be raised in line with inflation (or GDP growth rate) 
every year to maintain the environmental incentives of the tax.  
 31 
also used to increase tax benefits for various corporate investment and R&D 
efforts in carbon reduction activities.  
 
The Korean government could introduce a new energy-carbon tax in 2013 to 
partly offset public budget deficits from its scheduled, consecutive corporate 
income tax cuts (e.g., the size of carbon tax revenue, 0.1 – 0.3% of GDP). 
Introducing carbon tax would help cut emissions and stimulate clean technology 
investment.  
 
In fact, eco tax reform would lead to increased competitiveness as a result of 
fiscally neutral and net positive effects on employment due to the decrease of 
more distortive taxes on income and the promotion of innovation of new green 
R&D technologies. 
 
For example, using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model(DCGE), 
Kim et al.(2010) shows that the overall “positive” effect on economic 
efficiency(GDP) of implementing a new carbon tax scheme from 2013 together 
with corporate income tax(CIT) cuts and eco R&D subsidies in Korea would be 
significant. (see Figure 6).  
 
The Korean government is also pushing for other policy instruments such as 
Negotiated Agreement (NA) system and Cap-and-Trade system. Under the new 
NA system in 2013, companies will negotiate binding agreement with the 
government on energy use and greenhouse gas reduction targets. If businesses 
fail to meet the targets, they should pay penalties such as correcting mandates and 
fines. Also, based on the Comprehensive Act on Green Growth, the government 
is planning to introduce a Cap-and-Trade system for CO2 tradable permits in 
2015.    
 
This is time for setting up the Korea‟s Eco Tax Reform with a view to our future 
development and it should also reflect more closely the sustainable issue being 
addressed.  
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On the early stage of implementing eco tax reform in many countries, there were 
concerns about losing international competitiveness of industries and business 
association.  
 
 
Figure 6.  The Effects of Alternative Revenue-recycling Schemes  
`from Carbon Taxation in Korea :  25 EUR Case  
 
          (a) CO2 emissions 
 
(b) GDP 
Source: Kim S.-R. et al.(2010) 
 
 33 
 
However, as regards of impact of the scheme has been successful through 
performing with clear goal and collecting public opinions. In Germany it could 
achieve by differentiating tax rates and making special provisions for vulnerable 
groups. So that private households and small businesses are those who are 
unlikely to pay high rates.  In UK, there has been extensive consultation with 
business and designed in a way that protects the competitiveness of UK firms. 
UK industries and businesses receive a 80% discount to Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) in return for Climate Change Agreements (CCA) to meet energy 
efficiency and/or carbon emission targets.        
 
It is important to maintain transparency and ensure the participation of businesses 
and local people in the planning and use of the tax which can defuse potential 
opposition to a new environmental tax charge.  
 
Public would be more inclined to support new carbon taxes if the tax revenues 
are used to fund a broader package of measures such as environmental projects 
and/or enhanced capital allowances for investment certain energy-saving /green 
technologies. It could help gain industry buy-in and reduce the cost of business 
arising from carbon taxation.  
 
For Korea, the carbon tax scheme would need to designed alongside a broader 
fiscal package of measures (notionally funded from carbon tax revenues) in order 
to protect the international competitiveness of firms. For instance, energy-
intensive industries could receive a discount to the proposed carbon tax rates in 
return for joining a successful NA programs to improve energy efficiency and/or 
reduce emissions to specific levels.  
 
Hypothecation of part of carbon tax revenue to subsidize green projects in 
industries and/or low-income families could also raise public acceptability of new   
carbon taxation. 
 
Knowledge transfer between countries (e.g., via GGGI) about the use of 
economic instruments in environmental policy would be desirable, whereby 
country-specific conditions are being considered when such a transfer is done.  
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Current energy tax system in Korea is not sufficient for fostering low-carbon, 
green growth. In some parts, the government is subsidising environmentally 
harmful behaviors such as fossil fuel consumption, while considering imposing 
carbon taxes on those same behaviors later on. 
 
It is time to take concrete measures to implement the national green growth 
strategy. One of such measures will be to introduce a carbon tax in the near future. 
It is also important to invent “smart” ways of recycling the carbon tax revenues to 
achieve its voluntary CO2 reduction target and provide technological momentum 
for “green growth” development. The introduction of the tax scheme would be a 
starting point for the nation's campaign to increase energy-efficiency, combat 
climate change and promote nation-wide green technologies.  
 
The government needs to formulate “smart” taxation and fiscal policies to 
promote, rather than thwart, innovation for low-carbon, green growth. So, green 
tax commissions‟ or „inter-ministerial committees‟ for national eco-tax reform 
should also be emphasized. They can make detailed and more realistic proposals 
for mid- and long-term environmental tax reform in Korea and act as a forum for 
discussion on topics that include design, rates and the likely impacts. Analyzing 
and recommending to reform by political parties and academic and institute 
circles can be available. 
 
More attention needs to be paid to increase the knowledge of designing 
environmental tax schemes with continued research and development. 
 
In implementing the appropriate eco tax reform, it is necessary to weigh partly 
conflicting demands against each other for energy-intensive sectors, ecological 
effectiveness, economic efficiency, compatibility with market principles and 
issues of administrative feasibility. Such a balance must be determined politically 
in order to reduce uncertainty about future development.  
 
There are still ways to go, even though government got off to a first step to eco-
sound fiscal policies. Compared with other OECD countries, Korea has less 
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energy-efficient industrial structures with complicated fiscal policies and large 
differences of tax burdens on each energy-demanding sectors.  
 
 
Table 5.  Example Roadmap for Eco Tax Reform in Korea (2010-) 
 
Policy 
Instruments 
Plans 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
Eco tax Reform 
(including energy- 
carbon taxes  
and elements of  
carbon tax) 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
  
Full 
   
       
Cap and trade 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
    
Full 
 
       
V.A or N.A. 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
Phase 
I  
Phase 
II    
       
Compensation for 
Key Industries‟ 
competitiveness 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
  
Full 
   
       
Pro-poor policies 
(redistribution) 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
  
Full 
   
       
 
 
Therefore, Korea is now facing to prepare for the post-Kyoto scheme which 
would enforce to find a new paradigm for dealing with environmental 
sustainability and economic growth. In order to implement the Korea‟s new 
scheme successfully, a key theme “green taxes” would be essential to provide 
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greater efficiency gain through helping to „get the prices right‟ associated with 
their environmental externalities.  
 
Further, it is required to consider secondary instruments such as direct 
compensation payments, price support and tax exemptions for unfair burdens of 
low-income households and more energy-vulnerable sectors. All those 
approaches might be offset of distributional consequences as mitigating the 
harmfulness of eco-motivated fiscal policies.  
 
It‟s pretty obvious that the more we delay action, the more cost we pay. If we 
invest green technology in recent economic slowdown, we will have a global 
initiative that would make our economy more competitive in the long run.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
The “Green” Growth Model  (Fullerton and Kim, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous Variables  
Utility (U) 
Consumption (C) 
Output (Y) 
Environmental Quality (N) 
Private Capital (K) 
Abatement Knowledge (H) 
Pollution (P) 
Effective Pollution (Z)                   
 
Key parameters  
Environmental preference () 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution () 
Time preference rate () 
Environmental productivity () 
Pollution-conversion factor () 
Output elasticity of abatement knowledge (á) 
Ecological capacity factor ()                              
Degree of prior tax distortion () 
 
Policy instruments 
Pollution tax  (p ) 
Private capital income tax  (K ) 
Public investment in environmental R&D ( H ) 
 
 
 
Fig.  A1.   Diagram of Greening the Tax and Budget System Towards Sustainable Economic Growth  
 
 
 
Preferences 
Technology 
Ecology 
Others 
(tax system, etc.) 
Policies 
( )N E N P 
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Fig.  A2.   The Regeneration of the Environment.  „Sustainable development‟ ( 0N  ) requires that pollution P is constant in the 
long run and does not exceed the maximum absorption capacity. Due to the concavity of E(N), two levels of N may have 0N  . One 
has low N with E' > 0, and the other has high N with E' < 0. With a constant level of pollution P, only the latter equilibrium is stable, so 
this study focuses on that case.  For more details, see Neher (1990), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), and Bovenberg and Smulders 
(1995, 1996). 
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Fig.  A3.  Possible Win-Win Outcomes from Green Tax and Budget Reform (GTBR) 
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Fig.  A4.  Comparison of OECD countries: Tax Structure, Energy Intensity, CO2 Intensity, and Renewables Portion   
 
 
 
 42 
 
 
 
 
where environmental tax rate =   1)1/(1 1  ULLD ttMt   
labor tax rate  = Lt   
marginal environmental damage = )( MEDP    
uncompensated labor supply elasticity = 
U   
  
 
Fig.  A5.  Graphical Illustration of Eco Tax Reform (ETR) from Income Tax to Energy Tax   
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 Pearce (1991):  Environmental taxes might offer a so-called  “double dividend (DD)” (i.e.,  these taxes not only improve  
the environment but might also reduce welfare costs of the overall tax system).  
=>   Related question: “Whether the optimal environmental tax in a second-best world lies above or below the social marginal 
damages(MED)?”  is  the cornerstone of much recent literature.   
         
 Earlier view (optimistic DD):  The second-best optimal pollution tax would be higher than necessary just to correct the 
externality(=MED).  
               e.g.,  Tullock (1967), Terkla (1984), Lee & Misiolek (1986), Pearce (1991), Repetto et al (1992), Nordhaus (1993) 
 
 Recent studies (pessimistic DD):  Environmental taxes typically exacerbates pre-existing tax distortions and, therefore, the 
optimal pollution tax should lie below the Pigouvian level (≡ social marginal damages)  –  the critical role of “pre-existing 
tax distortions” and negative “tax interaction” effects   
  e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder(1995), Parry(1995), Oats(1995), Fullerton(1997), etc.   
 
 More recent studies (mixed DD, but generally optimistic): 
The prospects of DD depends on various parameters on the structure of preferences and technology (e.g., degree of relative 
complementarity of taxed dirty good w.r.t. leisure,  ; demand elasticity of taxed dirty good, D  etc.)  or  “Whether the 
second-best pollution tax (tD*)  should be greater (or less) than the first-best pollution tax (τP≡ MED)” depends on the 
following many factors (e.g., MED, prior income tax rates (tL), tax rate on scarcity rents by non-auctioned permits((t∏) , 
and some  key elasticities in related markets, etc.)   
        e.g., Kim (2002), Bovenberg and Goulder(2002), West and Williams(2004),Ballard et al.(2005),  etc. 
 
=>   Generalized second-best environmental tax rules (Kim, 2002) 
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where    1)1/(1 1  ULL ttM   is marginal excess burden of  prior income taxes. 
 
 
Fig.  A6.   The Literature on ETR and employment:  “Weak” form of Green Growth (I) 
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Fig.  A7.  Comparison of Marginal Excess Burden : Energy vs. Labor Taxes 
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Can tighter environmental regulation or taxes boost economic growth (i.e., Green Growth, GG)?  If so, when?  
 
 
<Two contrasting views> 
 
 Exogenous Growth Models (Ramsey-style, Solow):  pessimistic GG 
- Technical change is modeled as “exogenous” parameter. 
- Optimal Pollution control hurts growth by raising abatement costs. 
                 e.g., Jorgenson & Wilcoxen(1990), Xepapadeas(1993), Tahvonen & Kuuluvainen(1993), Nordhaus(1994), 
Goulder(1995), Nordhaus & Boyer(1999), etc. 
 
  
 Endogenous (or New) Growth Models (Romer, Lucas,  Barro, Rebelo,  etc.): optimistic GG 
- Technical change becomes additional “endogenous” variable  
      (additional factor of production via investment in knowledge or technology)  
- Optimistic view on the growth-environment relationship 
(a tighter environmental policy may boost economic growth, at least in the long-run).   
               e.g., Bovenberg and Smulders(1995, 1996), Elbasha and Roe(1996),  Stokey(1996),  Bovenberg and de  
Mooij(1997), Hettich(2000), Fullerton and Kim(2008), etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  A8.  The Literature on ETR and growth:  “Strong” form of Green Growth (II) 
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Fig.  A9.  Conventional View on ETR and growth 
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Fig.  A10.   New View on ETR and growth 
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(a).  Small gap: “win-win” is highly likely  
 
  
 
(b).  large gap: “win-win”is modest 
 
 
Fig.  A11.   Optimal Environmental Policy for Green Growth 
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Denmark 4.65%,  Norway 3.67%,  Netherlands 3.63%,  Filand 3.27% 
 
>  Korea 2.92%  > OECD avg.  2.71% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  A12.    Environmentally related taxes as percent of GDP (2005) 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2007 
 
 
Fig.  A13.   Environmentally related taxes vs. Other income taxes:  International comparison  
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
National Debt (tril. Won) 122.1 133.6 165.7 203.1 248 282.8 298.9 309 
Debt-GDP ratio (%) 18.7 18.5 21.6 24.6 28.7 31.1 30.7 30.2 
Tax Revenue (tril. Won) 122.5 135.5 147.8 152 163.4 179.3 205 212.8 
Tax-GDP ratio (%) 18.8 18.8 19.3 18.4 18.9 19.7 21 20.8 
Source: MOSF(2009) 
 
Fig.  A14.   National Debt, Tax Revenue, and Tax Structure in Korea  
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Source: NTS(2009), MOSF(2009) 
 
 
 
Fig.  A15.   Environmentally related taxes vs. Other taxes in Korea 
tax revenue composition (1990-2005, Korea)
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(a) Personal Income Taxes (b) Corporate Income Taxes 
  
(c) Consumption Taxes (d) Property Taxes 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2009 
 
 
Fig.  A16.   Trends of Tax Structure : Korea vs. OECD average 
 
 
